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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
More than fifteen years after his underlying judgment of conviction became final, 
Wesley Wayne Austin appeals from the district court’s orders denying his motions to 
recuse the district judge, to void all judgments, orders, warrants, and detainers filed by 
that judge, and to enforce the terms of his plea agreement. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In addressing Austin’s prior appeal, the Court of Appeals set forth the relevant 
factual background of his underlying case as follows: 
In March 2001, pursuant to a plea agreement, Austin pled guilty to 
ten counts of felony issuance of insufficient funds check….  
 
At the change of plea hearing, the district court reviewed the plea 
agreement with Austin and informed him that the agreement was non-
binding.  Austin indicated that he understood, and entered a plea of guilty 
on each count.  Subsequently, the district court sentenced Austin on each 
count to “serve a minimum of two years and a maximum of three years.”  
The Court ran the counts consecutively.  The Court suspended the 
sentence and placed Austin on probation for a period of ten years.  
However, the judgment of conviction indicated that each of the sentences 
consisted of two years determinate and three years indeterminate.  Austin 
appealed.  In 2001, while Austin’s appeal was pending, the district court 
filed an amended judgment of conviction that restated the sentences as 
three years with two years determinate on each count, consecutive.  In an 
unpublished opinion, this Court ordered the appeal dismissed as untimely. 
 
In 2010, the Department of Correction filed a report of probation 
violation stemming from federal charges.  The district court issued a no-
bond warrant, which was served on Austin while he remained in federal 
custody.  In April 2013, Austin filed a Rule 35 motion alleging his sentence 
was illegal because the district court was required to run the counts 
concurrently pursuant to the plea agreement.  The district court denied the 
motion.  Austin timely appealed.  Subsequently, Austin filed a motion to 
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dismiss the warrant stemming from the alleged probation violation, and a 
motion to dismiss asserting the district court was without jurisdiction over 
him.  The district court denied his motions.  Austin filed an amended notice 
of appeal. 
 
State v. Austin, Docket No. 41521, 2015 Unpublished Op. No. 436, pp.1-4 (Idaho App., 
March 26, 2015).  The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court.  Id. at 10. 
On January 15, 2016, Austin filed a motion to recuse the district judge from 
further proceedings, a motion to void that judge’s judgments and orders, and a motion 
to enforce the terms of his plea agreement.  (R., pp.18-37, 40.)  At a subsequent 
hearing, Austin narrowed his argument to only the motion seeking the judge’s recusal.  
(Tr., p.4, Ls.3-18.)  The district court denied this motion (R., p.44) and Austin appealed 
(R., pp.46-47).  The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed that appeal for lack of a final 
judgment or order.  (R., p.56.)  When the case returned to the district court, the court 
entered orders denying Austin’s additional motions and entered judgment against Austin 





Austin states the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Did the State of Idaho breach the stipulated binding portion of the 
bifurcated Plea Agreement between the State of Idaho and Wesley Wayne 
Austin? 
 
2. Did the Honorable Judge Jon J. Shindurling conduct an ex parte 
phone conversation between the Mayor of Blackfoot ID. and himself, while 
alleged victim of the case was present in the Mayor’s office and was his 
bias enough to warrant recusal? 
 
3. Based on Judicial Misconduct of an ex parte communication, are 
the orders, judgments, detainers, warrants or holds Judge Jon J. 
Shindurling issued void due to the misconduct? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.6.) 
 
The state consolidates and rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Was the district court without jurisdiction to consider the untimely challenges 






The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Consider The Untimely Challenges Austin 
Raised To His Judgment Of Conviction 
 
A. Introduction 
Several years after his judgment of conviction became final, Austin raised three 
challenges to that judgment, arguing: (1) that his sentence violated his plea agreement 
and he was entitled to specific performance; (2) that the district judge needed to be 
recused for allegedly engaging in ex parte communications prior to sentencing; and (3) 
that, as a consequence of the alleged ex parte communications, the judgments and 
orders of the court were void.  (R., pp.18-37.)  The district court denied Austin’s 
motions.  (R., pp.44, 84-91.) 
On appeal, Austin argues that the district court erred by denying his motions.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.7-31.)  Austin’s arguments fail.  First, none of Austin’s challenges 
were timely, and the district court therefore lacked jurisdiction to consider, much less 
grant relief on, any of them.  Second, Austin’s claims in relation to his guilty plea were 
previously raised to and addressed by the Court of Appeals, and the issue is therefore 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata.  Finally, as demonstrated by the district court, 
Austin’s additional claims fail on their merits.  Austin has failed to show that the district 
court erred by denying his untimely motions. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, given free review.  State v. 




C. The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Consider Austin’s Challenges To His 
Judgment Of Conviction 
 
“Absent a statute or rule extending its jurisdiction, the trial court’s jurisdiction to 
amend or set aside a judgment expires once the judgment becomes final, either by 
expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the judgment on appeal.”  State v. 
Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 (2003).  The register of actions in 
Austin’s case reveals that his judgment of conviction was entered on April 16, 2001.  
(R., p.7.)  Austin did not file an appeal timely from that judgment,1 and it therefore 
became final on May 28, 2001.  Compare Jakoski, supra, with I.A.R. 14(a).  Austin’s 
challenges to his judgment were thus untimely and the district court lacked jurisdiction 
to address those challenges, much less grant relief on the grounds asserted.   
Though the district court did not deny Austin’s untimely motions on the basis that 
it lacked jurisdiction to consider those motions, this Court may affirm an ultimately 
correct ruling by applying the correct legal standards.  Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 
579, 21 P.3d 895, 901 (2001).  The state asks this Court to affirm the district court’s 
orders on the alternative basis that it lacked jurisdiction to consider, or grant relief on, 
Austin’s untimely motions. 
 
D. In Addition To The Jurisdictional Bar, Austin’s Challenges In Relation To His Plea 
Agreement Are Also Barred By The Doctrine Of Res Judicata 
 
In addition to failing on jurisdictional grounds, Austin’s claims fail on other bases 
as well.  First, even if the district court had jurisdiction to consider Austin’s challenge to 
                                            
1  Though Austin did file an appeal (see R., p.8), that appeal was not timely and was 
therefore dismissed, see State v. Austin, Docket No. 41521, 2015 Unpublished Op. No. 
436, p.3 (Idaho App., March 26, 2015).   
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his conviction and sentence based on his plea agreement (which it did not), that 
challenge would still fail under the doctrine of res judicata.  The doctrine of res judicata 
prevents re-litigation of issues that have been previously decided in a final judgment or 
decision in an action between the same litigants.  State v. Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 
863, 11 P.3d 481, 482 (2000).  Similarly, claims which could have been raised to the 
Court previously but were not are barred in subsequent litigation by the principles of res 
judicata.  Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 766, 760 P.2d 1174, 1182 (1988).  Like 
jurisdictional issues, the question of whether an action is barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata is a question of law over which an appellate court exercises free review.  
Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 863, 11 P.3d at 482. 
In his prior case, Austin challenged the legality of his sentence, arguing that it 
failed to conform to his plea agreement.  State v. Austin, Docket No. 41521, 2015 
Unpublished Op. No. 436, p.4 (Idaho App., March 26, 2015).  The Court of Appeals 
reviewed Austin’s plea agreement and plea colloquy and determined that, before Austin 
entered his guilty plea, the district court informed him that it was treating his plea 
agreement as nonbinding.  Id. at 7-8.  Austin acquiesced in that treatment and 
affirmatively acknowledged that the district court could choose to run his sentences 
consecutively.  Id. at 8.  Austin’s sentence, therefore, “conformed to the plea agreement 
as understood and accepted at the entry of guilty pleas.”  Id.  Because the lawfulness of 
Austin’s sentence, and whether it conformed to his plea agreement, has been raised to 
and decided by the Court of Appeals previously—even if Austin’s current argument in 
relation to that issue was not—it is barred under the doctrine of res judicata.  If the 
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district court had jurisdiction to consider Austin’s untimely motion, its denial of that 
motion should still be affirmed on this basis. 
 
E. In Addition To The Jurisdictional Bar, Austin’s Remaining Challenges Also Fail 
On Their Merits 
 
Austin’s remaining challenges are premised on his theory that the district court 
engaged in an ex parte communication with one of the victims regarding his underlying 
sentence.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.17-30.)  Even were the Court to consider the merits of 
these challenges, Austin’s arguments fail because, as shown by the district court, that 
underlying premise is false.   
At the hearing on his motion to recuse the district judge, Austin accused the 
judge of violating the canons of judicial conduct by having an ex parte communication 
regarding Austin’s sentence with Randy Young and/or the mayor of Blackfoot prior to 
Austin’s sentencing hearing.  (Tr., p.6, L.11 – p.7, L.21.)  Inferring that the witness 
directed his comments at the judge, Austin quoted Mr. Young as saying:  “‘I was then, 
and I’m still appalled’ and ‘I was appalled to think that our judge would be so common 
and predictable about the swathe Austin has cut through the community.’”  (Tr., p.15, 
Ls.7-15.)  But, as shown by the excerpt of the sentencing hearing transcript included as 
an Appendix to Austin’s Appellant’s brief, that is not what the witness actually said. 
Mr. Young complained that there had been no opinion box to give community feedback 
to the prosecutor’s office, which had been promised.  (Appendix 23 (Tr., p.7, Ls.11-21).)  
He confronted the prosecutor about overhearing a conversation between him and the 
mayor regarding the sentence the prosecutor expected Austin to receive.  (Id. (Tr., p.7, 
Ls.21-25).)  Then Mr. Young stated, with a significant difference from that reported by 
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Austin, “I was then and I am still now appalled.  I was appalled you would think our 
Judge would be so common and predictable about the swathe Austin has cut through 
this community.”  (Id. (Tr., p.7, L.25 – p.8, L.3) (emphasis added).) 
The transcript, correctly reported, demonstrates that the “you” Mr. Young was 
addressing had to be someone other than the judge.  That is consistent with the district 
court’s findings:  As explained during Austin’s hearing on his motion for recusal, at the 
time of sentencing, the judge did not know any of the victims; he did not know who the 
mayor of Blackfoot was nor where the mayor’s office was located.  (Tr., p.12, Ls.12-14; 
p.20, Ls.7-13.)  Mr. Young’s statements referred “to a conference that he [Mr. Young] 
had with [the prosecutor] in anticipation of the [sentencing] hearing” and “had nothing to 
do with” the judge.  (Tr., p.12, Ls.15-18; p.20, Ls.13-18.)  The judge never engaged in 
ex parte communication.  (Tr., p.12, L.12 – p.13, L.1.)  And the excerpt of the hearing 
transcript, correctly reported, supports that finding.   
Even if these issues are considered on their merits, because the district court did 
not engage in ex parte communications about Austin’s sentence prior to his sentencing 
hearing, there is no basis for Austin’s claims of bias against the district judge.  There is, 
therefore, no basis for Austin’s motion to recuse the judge, nor is there any basis for his 
motion to render void the district court’s judgments and orders.  Austin has failed to 
show error in the district court’s denial of these motions.  If these issues are considered 





The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s orders 
denying Austin’s untimely motions. 
 DATED this 31st day of July, 2017. 
 
 
      _/s/ Russell J. Spencer__________ 
      RUSSELL J. SPENCER 
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